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Note
ARIZONA v. EVANS: NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In Arizona v. Evans, the Supreme Court further narrowed the
scope of the exclusionary rule.1 The Court held that evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible in a criminal trial
if an officer conducted an unlawful search and seizure in good faith
reliance on erroneous computer information generated by court em-
ployees.2 The Court broadened the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule established in United States v. Leon,3 reasoning that
application of the rule in Evans would not deter future Fourth
Amendment violations and would impose too high a cost on society's
law enforcement interests.' In so ruling, the Court overestimated
costs to law enforcement and underestimated the deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule. Furthermore, the Court's ruling may severely
impact individual civil liberties by failing to adequately consider the
costs imposed on individual liberty and privacy that result from a nar-
rowed exclusionary rule.
I. THE CASE
On January 5, 1991, a Phoenix, Arizona, police officer stopped
Isaac Evans for a minor traffic violation.5 After Evans admitted to driv-
ing with a suspended license, the officer returned to his patrol car and
conducted a routine computer check on Evans.6 The check not only
confirmed the suspended license, but also showed an outstanding mis-
demeanor warrant for Evans's arrest.7 Based on the warrant, the of-
ficer arrested Evans.8 After placing him in restraints, the officer
discovered marijuana on Evans's person and a bag of marijuana in his
car.
9
1. 115 S. CL 1185 (1995), revg866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994).
2. Id. at 1193-94.
3. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
4. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1200-03.
5. Id. at 1188.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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The State subsequently charged Evans with possession of mari-
juana." When the police reported Evans's arrest to the appropriate
court, however, court personnel discovered an error in the computer
record relied upon by the arresting officer.11 Although ajustice of the
peace had issued the warrant, court records showed that the warrant
had been quashed several weeks prior to Evans's arrest.'
2
Arguing that he was the victim of an unlawful search and seizure,
Evans filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during his
arrest.'" Evans relied on Arizona precedent, State v. Greene, 4 which
upheld application of the exclusionary rule where a defendant's arrest
resulted from inaccurate police computer records.1 5 At Evans's sup-
pression hearing, the trial court heard conflicting evidence suggesting
that either court employees or law enforcement employees could have
been responsible for the computer error.' 6 Distinguishing Greene, the
State argued that in Evans's case court employees, not police, caused
the error, and thus Greene was inapposite.' 7 Furthermore, the State
urged that the arresting officer acted on his good faith belief that a
valid warrant existed, and that use of the evidence should be permit-
ted pursuant to Arizona's "good faith exception" statute.' 8
10. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
11. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
12. Evans, 866 P.2d at 870.
13. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
14. 783 P.2d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). In State v. Greene, an Arizona police officer,
relying on computer records showing an outstanding warrant, arrested the appellee after
stopping him for a minor traffic violation. Id. at 829. While taking Greene into custody,
the officer discovered narcotics in his possession. Id. After charging Greene, however, law
enforcement officials learned that their computer records were erroneous; Greene's arrest
warrant had been quashed eight months earlier. Id. It was unclear from the record
whether police department personnel were responsible for the error. Id. at 830. In Greene,
the Arizona Court of Appeals allowed the suppression of evidence seized at the time of the
arrest, reasoning that
the ends of the exclusionary rule would be furthered in an appreciable way by
holding the evidence inadmissible because such a holding would tend to deter
the South Tucson Police Department from deliberately or negligently failing to
keep its paperwork or computer entries up to date, exposing persons to a possible
wrongful arrest.
Id.
15. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz.
1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
16. Evans, 866 P.2d at 870.
17. Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025-26.
18. Id. at 1026 (citing Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (1993)). The Arizona statutory
good faith exception provides in part:
A. If a party in a criminal proceeding seeks to exclude evidence from the
trier of fact because of the conduct of a peace officer in obtaining the evidence,
the proponent of the evidence may urge that the peace officer's conduct was
taken in a reasonable, good faith belief that the conduct was proper and that the
266 [VOL. 55:265
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Evans maintained that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
would be served regardless of the source of the mistake because exclu-
sion would deter future errors. 9 Evans also argued that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because police,
not judicial, error caused the unlawful arrest."0
The trial court found the source of the error irrelevant and
granted Evans's motion to suppress, reasoning that the exclusionary
rule serves to deter negligence by the State generally.2 1 The Arizona
Court of Appeals reversed, believing that exclusion under these cir-
cumstances would not deter those not "directly associated with the
arresting officers or the arresting officers' police department."
22
The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the intermediate appellate
court's opinion, maintaining that regardless of the source of the er-
ror, application of the rule would "hopefully serve to improve the effi-
ciency of those who keep records in our criminal justice system."23
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2 4 to determine
whether the exclusionary rule "requires suppression of evidence
seized incident to an arrest resulting from an inaccurate computer
record, regardless of whether police personnel or court personnel
were responsible for the record's continued presence in the police
computer."2
5
evidence discovered should not be kept from the trier of fact if otherwise
admissible.
B. The trial court shall not suppress evidence which is otherwise admissible
in a criminal proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a
peace officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation.
C. In this section:
1. "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concern-
ing the existence of facts which if true would be sufficient to consti-
tute probable cause.
2. "Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon:
(a) A statute which is subsequently ruled unconstitutional.
(b) A warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake.
(c) A controlling court precedent which is later overruled, unless
the court overruling the precedent orders the new precedent to
be applied retroactively.
Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (1993).
19. Evans, 836 P.2d at 1026.
20. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
21. Id.
22. Evans, 836 P.2d at 1027.
23. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994), rev'4 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
24. Arizona v. Evans, 114 S. Ct. 2131 (1994).
25. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1189.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
... -2The Fourth Amendment itself contains no express provision
for the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of its commands. 7
One of the first cases associated with the Supreme Court's develop-
ment of the exclusionary rule was Weeks v. United States.28 In Weeks, the
Court held that where a defendant's private papers were unlawfully
seized by federal law enforcement officers, and where the defendant
had made a seasonable request for the return of those papers, use of
the evidence at trial constituted "prejudicial error."29
The Weeks Court reasoned that the Constitution mandated exclu-
sion of evidence unlawfully seized by federal law enforcement of-
ficers.3" In Mapp v. Ohio,31 the Court not only imposed the
exclusionary rule on the states, it reaffirmed its belief that the exclu-
sionary rule was constitutionally mandated.32
A major turning point in the development of the exclusionary
rule came in 1973 with the Court's decision in United States v. Calan-
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The full Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
27. Id.
28. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and
Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases,
83 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1365, 1374 (1983).
29. 232 U.S. at 398. In Weeks, the Court reasoned that:
[i]f letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evi-
dence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is
of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution.
Id.
30. Id.; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 935 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
31. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
32. Id. The Court held that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, &y that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id. (emphasis
added). The Court reaffirmed Mapp in 1971 in Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Peniten-
tiary, 401 U.S. 560, 569 (1971).
268 [VOL. 55:265
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dra.3 s In Calandra, the Court held that a witness summoned before a
grand jury may not refuse to answer questions based on evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.34 Contrary to its earlier
statements in Mapp, the Calandra Court held that the exclusionary
rule constituted a 'judicially created remedy," not a personal constitu-
tional right.35 The Court found that the exclusionary rule functions
to "safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deter-
rent effect." 6 Thus, its use should be limited to circumstances "where
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."3 7 The
Court also adopted a cost-benefit approach to be used by a court
when considering application of the exclusionary rule: where the
benefits of deterrence are minimal and the cost to society's law en-
forcement interests are high, the rule does not apply.38
In the wake of Calandra, the Court has continued to narrow the
scope of the exclusionary rule.3 9 In 1976 the Court ruled that in civil
proceedings initiated by the federal government, the government
could use evidence unlawfully seized by state criminal law enforce-
ment agents. 40 That same year, the Court held that "where the State
has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitu-
tional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."41 Furthermore, in
1980 the Court held that unlawfully seized evidence may be used to
impeach a defendant's testimony.42 In each of these cases, the Court
concluded that society's law enforcement interests outweighed the
minimal benefits of deterrence.
B. Development of the "Good Faith" Exception
In 1984, in the landmark case of United States v. Leon, the
Supreme Court dramatically limited the reach of the exclusionary rule
by permitting the admission of "evidence obtained by officers acting
in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by prob-
33. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
34. Id. at 351-52.
35. Id. at 348.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 354.
39. Stewart, supra note 28, at 1389.
40. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
41. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
42. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980).
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able cause."43 The Court's decision in Leon established what is com-
monly referred to as the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.' In arriving at this holding, the Court concluded that applica-
tion of the rule would neither deter magistrates and judges from com-
mitting future errors nor alter the conduct of a police officer acting in
reasonable reliance on a warrant.45 Therefore, applying Calandra's
cost-benefit analysis, the Court reasoned that application of the rule
could not be justified because its use would yield no appreciable de-
terrence benefits and would impose "substantial costs" to society's law
enforcement interests. 46 The Court held that an officer's reliance
must be "objectively reasonable" before the exception may be in-
43. 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984).
44. Id. at 913. Several Supreme Court Justices advocated a good faith exception in
cases prior to Leon. In his dissent in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 538 (White,J, dissenting),
Justice White opined that both Weeks and Mapp "overshot their mark insofar as they aimed
to deter lawless action by law enforcement personnel." Id. The exclusionary rule, Justice
White argued, failed to achieve its intended results and had proven to be a "senseless obsta-
cle to arriving at the truth in many criminal trials." Id. Consequently, Justice White pro-
posed substantial modification to the rule "so as to prevent its application in those many
circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good-faith
belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this
belief." Id.; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 913 n.l1 (detailing history of prior debate surround-
ing the adoption of a good faith exception).
45. Leon, 468 U.S. at 915-16. The Court relied on three factors in finding that applica-
tion of the rule would not affect the behavior ofjudges and magistrates. First, the Court
concluded that the exclusionary rule was "designed to deter police misconduct rather than
to punish the errors of judges and magistrates." Id. at 916. Second, the Court found no
evidence that suggested that judges and magistrates are "inclined to ignore or subvert the
Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the ex-
treme sanction of exclusion." Id. Third, the Court found no basis for "believing that ex-
clusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on
the issuing judge or magistrate" because they are "not adjuncts to the law enforcement
team." Id. at 916-17. Therefore, judges and magistrates "have no stake in the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions." Id. at 917.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that "[plenalizing the officer for the magistrate's
error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amend-
ment violations." Id. at 921. The Court reasoned that magistrates ultimately assume re-
sponsibility for a probable-cause determination, and police officers "cannot be expected to
question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of
the warrant is technically sufficient." Id.
46. Id. at 913.
270 [VOL. 55:265
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voked.47 Ordinarily, an officer has acted objectively reasonably when
he conducts a search pursuant to a warrant.48
The Court applied the Leon standard in Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
an opinion handed down on the same day as Leon.4" In Sheppard, the
Court held that officers acted reasonably in relying upon a warrant
issued by a judge who failed to make necessary clerical corrections."
Three years later, the Court expanded the good faith exception, hold-
ing that a police officer's reliance on a statute is objectively reasonable
even when the statute is later found unconstitutional. 51
III. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
In Arizona v. Evans, the Supreme Court declined to apply the ex-
clusionary rule where an arrest resulted from a police officer's reli-
ance on an erroneous computer record generated by court
employees.52 As an initial matter, however, the Court considered
whether it could maintain jurisdiction over the case.53 Evans argued
that because the Arizona Supreme Court based its decision on an "ad-
equate and independent state ground," the Supreme Court lacked ju-
risdiction to review the case. 4 The Court was not persuaded by
47. Id. at 922. In Leon, the Court provided guidance for determining when an officer
has acted objectively reasonably. Id. at 923. The Court asserted that an officer has not
acted in objective good faith when he obtains a warrant by intentionally misleading a mag-
istrate or judge or when an officer demonstrates a reckless disregard for the truth in
presenting the facts to a magistrate orjudge. Id. Similarly, an officer has not acted objec-
tively reasonably when he relies on a warrant based on an affidavit "'so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,'" id. at 923
(quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell,J., concurring in part)), or
under circumstances where the "issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role." Id.
(citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)). Finally, an officer who relies on
a facially deficient warrant has not acted in objective good faith. Id.
48. Id. at 922 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32 (1982)).
49. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
50. Id. at 990-91. In Sheppard, the officer pointed out to the issuing judge all potential
defects in the application for the warrant. Id. Thejudge assured the officers that he would
make all necessary changes and, upon issuing the warrant to the officers, informed them
that the warrant provided sufficient authority to conduct the search. Id. at 986.
51. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987).
52. 115 S. Ct. at 1194. Despite the fact that Evans's trial produced conflicting evidence
as to the source of the clerical error and despite the fact that the certiorari question ad-
dressed the issue directly, see supra text accompanying notes 24-25, the Court declined to
address the question of whether the exclusionary rule applies where police department
clerks caused the error. Id. (O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, jJ., concurring) ("Prudently, then,
the Court limits itself to the question of whether a court employee's departure from such
established procedures is the kind of error to which the exclusionary rule should apply.")
(emphasis added).
53. Id. at 1189-90.
54. Id. at 1189.
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Evans's argument, and found that in accordance with its decision in
Michigan v. Long,55 jurisdiction was proper.56 The Long Court held
that when
a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on fed-
eral law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when
the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion . . . [the
Court] . . . will accept as the most reasonable explanation
that the state court decided the case the way it did because it
believed that federal law required it to do so.57
In dicta, the Long Court suggested that a state court can avoid
review simply by including a "plain statement" in its opinion indicat-
ing that references to federal precedent served merely as guidance
and did not "compel the result" that the court had reached.5" The
Court in Evans noted that the Arizona Supreme Court made reference
to United States v. Leon and failed to make an express statement that
the court used Leon only for guidance.59 Consequently, the Court
found that the state court based its opinion "squarely upon" an inter-
pretation of federal law and that jurisdiction was proper.6 °
In holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply, the Court
expressly declined to rely on pre-Calandra decisions,6" and instead ad-
hered to the cost-benefit approach articulated in Calandra and later
cases.61 Specifically, the Court applied the good faith exception estab-
lished in Leon to the facts of the Evans case,6" and held that applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule would have little or no deterrent effect
where court employees were responsible for the errors that led to an
unlawful arrest.64
55. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
56. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1190-91.
57. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
58. Id. at 1041.
59. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1190-91.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1192-93. The Court rejected Evans's argument, which relied in part upon
Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). The Court explained
that at the time Whiteley was decided, "identification of a Fourth Amendment violation
[was] ... synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to evidence secured inci-
dent to that violation." Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192. Later case law rejected such a "reflexive"
application of the rule. Id. at 1192-93.
62. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192-93; see also supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
63. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)).
64. Id.
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The Court stated that the exclusionary rule traditionally served to
discourage misconduct by police officers, not court employees.65 The
Court found no evidence to suggest that court employees are "in-
clined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment, or that lawless-
ness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction
of exclusion."66 Thus, the Court concluded that application of the
rule would have no "significant" deterrent effect on court employ-
ees.67 The Court supported this conclusion by reasoning that, unlike
police officers who are engaged in the "competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime," court employees have no real stake in the outcome
of criminal prosecutions because they are sufficiently detached from
police operations.68 Consequently, the Court found that the threat of
evidence suppression would not deter court employees from making
future errors.69
The Court also held that application of the exclusionary rule in
Evans would not deter police officers from committing future Fourth
Amendment violations because the arresting officer acted objectively
reasonably in relying on the computer record.7" In the Court's view,
the officer who arrested Evans would have been negligent if he had
ignored the warrant. 71 The officer was duty-bound to arrest Evans,
and therefore, application of the exclusionary rule "could not be ex-
pected to alter the behavior of the arresting officer. "72 Rather, evi-
dence suppression would only serve to discourage police from fully
discharging their duties. 73 Thus, in the absence of an appreciable de-
terrent effect, use of the rule could not justify the substantial costs of
exclusion.7 4
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court's holding in Evans broadens the scope of the good
faith exception in two respects.75 First, the Court extended the excep-
tion to encompass not only judges and magistrates, as in Leon, but
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1194.
71. Id. at 1193.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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court employees as well. 7 1 Second, the Court extended the Leon ex-
ception beyond situations involving reasonable reliance on a pre-
sumptively valid warrant to include cases where no warrant exists at
the time of the search.77 By broadening the good faith exception,
Evans necessarily narrows the scope of the exclusionary rule, thus con-
tributing to whatJustice Brennan aptly described as the Court's "grad-
ual but determined strangulation" of the rule.78  This continuing
trend is premised upon questionable reasoning and may yield dis-
turbing results in the area of civil liberties.
A. Jurisdiction
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, strongly objected to
the Court's decision to assert jurisdiction in Evans.79 In her dissent,
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Arizona Supreme Court failed to
base its decision in Evans on "a close analysis" of Fourth Amendment
precedent and that the court had explicitly found Leon unhelpftul in
deciding the case.8 ° The Court's decision to assert jurisdiction rests
on questionable grounds.
The Arizona Supreme Court's decision contains little discussion
of federal law, except to discount the lower court's consideration of
Leon.8 1 Furthermore, the court followed prior Arizona precedent es-
tablished in State v. Greene, 2 and considered application of the good
faith exception as defined by Arizona statute."3 These facts support
Evans's argument that the Arizona Supreme Court based its decision
on adequate and independent state law grounds. The decision to as-
sert jurisdiction in Evans suggests a heightened standard that state
courts must meet in order to ensure a finding of adequate and in-
dependent state law grounds. This standard surpasses that established
76. Id.
77. Id. Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the Court's reasoning in Leon "assumed
the existence of a warrant" and, therefore, is "wholly inapplicable to warrantless searches
and seizures." Id.
78. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928-29 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1198 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80. Id. ("Indeed, the [Arizona Supreme C]ourt found our most relevant decision ...
Leon... 'not helpful!'") (quoting State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 871 (Ariz. 1994)).
81. Evans, 866 P.2d at 871 ("Leon is also not helpful.... [The] situation [in Leon] is
distinguishable from one like this, where no warrant at all was in existence at the time of
the arrest.").
82. 783 P.2d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text;
Evans, 866 P.2d at 870-74.
83. Evans, 866 P.2d at 871 (rejecting the State's argument that Arizona's codification of
the good faith exception, Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925, supra note 18, should apply
where there was no showing of "reasonable judgmental error").
274 [VOL. 55:265
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by the facts in Long, where, unlike in Evans, federal law clearly played
a central role in the Michigan Supreme Court's decision. 4 After Ev-
ans, state courts wishing to avoid Supreme Court review must heed the
Court's emphasis in Evans on the need for a plain statement denial of
reliance on federal law."5 Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court did
everything short of including such a plain statement. Arguably, it was
this absence that led the Supreme Court to conclude that jurisdiction
was proper in Evans.
Evans aptly demonstrates that Long's jurisdictional presumption
may cause "premature settlement of important federal questions."86
Justice Ginsburg noted that the Arizona Supreme Court viewed Evans
as involving more than the mere slip of a court employee in maintain-
ing police records, but rather as illuminating the "'potential for
Orwellian mischief in the government's increasing reliance on com-
puter technology in law enforcement."" Emphasizing the increased
risk of error caused by computerization and the need for swift correc-
tive action, Justice Ginsburg persuasively argued that the Long pre-
sumption "impedes the States' ability to serve as laboratories for
testing solutions to novel legal problems." 8 Such an approach is illog-
ical particularly in the instant case where the "debate over the efficacy
of an exclusionary rule reveals that deterrence is an empirical ques-
tion, not a logical one." 9 As Justice Ginsburg stated, "the Long pre-
sumption interferes prematurely with state-court endeavors to explore
different solutions to new problems facing modern society."90
B. Costs to Society's Law Enforcement Interests
In order to justify the good faith exception and other efforts to
narrow the exclusionary rule, the Court has raised a number of policy
concerns regarding the high costs that the exclusionary rule imposes
on society's law enforcement interests.91 In Evans, as in Leon, the
84. Except for two references to its state constitution, the Michigan Supreme Court's
decision in Long relied heavily on federal law. People v. Long, 320 N.W.2d 866 (Mich.
1982). The Michigan Supreme Court, unlike the Arizona court in Evans, specifically fo-
cused on application of Fourth Amendment protection under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). Long, 320 N.W.2d at 870 ("We hold, therefore, that the ... search . . . was pro-
.scribed by the Fourth Amendment.. ").
85. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
86. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1202 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1198.
88. I&
89. Id. at 1200.
90. Id. at 1202.
91. See, e.g., id. at 1193-94 (majority opinion); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-92.
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Court characterized the rule as an extreme sanction.12 The Court has
expressed concern that the rule requires exclusion of what is often
probative and reliable evidence relating to the guilt of the defend-
ant." Use of the rule, the Court has argued, allows the guilty to go
free; this rewards criminals and in turn undermines public confidence
in, and respect for, the judicial system and the law. 4 In describing
the rule as an extreme sanction, the Court has stated that the "dispar-
ity in particular cases between the error committed by the police of-
ficer and-the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the
rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the
concept of justice." 5
However, the Court's characterization of the exclusionary rule as
an extreme sanction is unfounded because the rule merely restores
law enforcement to the position it held prior to the unlawful seizure. 6
Criticism of the exclusionary rule is often misdirected and is more
appropriately "directed at the fourth amendment itself."97 Retired
Justice Potter Stewart contended:
It is true that.., the effect of the rule is to deprive the courts
of extremely relevant, often direct evidence of the guilt of
the defendant. But... the same extremely relevant evidence
would not have been obtained had the police officer com-
plied with the commands of the fourth amendment in the
first place.98
Moreover, one empirical study suggests that, while application of the
exclusionary rule may weaken the government's case, it rarely causes
prosecutors to abandon cases, or results in dismissals or acquittals. 9
92. Evans, 115 S. CL at 1193; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1983).
93. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490.
94. Id. at 490-91.
95. Id. at 490.
96. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (StevensJ., dissenting) (citing Stewart, supra note 28, at
1392).
97. Stewart, supra note 28, at 1392.
98. Id.
99. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF THE EXCLU-
SIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROsEcTrrIONS 14 (Rep. No. GGD-79-45 (1979)). The
General Accounting Office study showed that of all cases federal prosecutors declined for
prosecution, only 0.4% were primarily due to Fourth Amendment violation problems. Id.
Furthermore, the study showed that motions to suppress evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment were filed in 10.5% of all federal criminal cases surveyed. Id. at 8.
Courts denied suppression in approximately 80 to 90% of cases handled by large U.S.
attorneys offices. Id. at 10. Overall, evidence was suppressed in only 1.3% of the cases
studied. Id. at 8.
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C. Deterrence
While the conclusion that application of the exclusionary rule
will not deter judges and magistrates from committing future errors
may itself be debatable, the Court's extension of this rationale to in-
clude court employees is even more tenuous. Justice Stevens's dissent
correctly observed that the Leon Court's "exemption of judges and
magistrates from the deterrent ambit of the exclusionary rule rested,
consistently with the emphasis on the warrant requirement, on those
officials' constitutionally determined role in issuing warrants." 100 This
same reasoning cannot extend to court clerks, "some of whom work in
the same building with police officers and may have more regular and
direct contact with police than with judges or magistrates."' 0 ' Fur-
thermore, in this modem age of electronic recordkeeping, "court per-
sonnel and police officers are not neatly compartmentalized actors.
Instead, they serve together to carry out the State's information-gath-
ering objectives." 102 This co-mingling of court and police clerk re-
cordkeeping functions can make it difficult, if not impossible, to
discern who is responsible for the error103 As Justice Ginsburg ob-
served, "Whether particular records are maintained by the police or
the courts should not be dispositive where a single computer database
can answer all calls." 04 Given these logistical realities of modem judi-
cial and law enforcement systems, it is disingenuous to portray court
employees as entirely detached and neutral actors.
The Court unconvincingly suggested that in order to deter court
employees, they must have a direct stake in the outcome of criminal
trials." 5 Justice Stevens persuasively argued that law enforcement offi-
cials are in the best position to monitor errors such as those that oc-
curred in Evans, and that these officials "can influence mundane
communication procedures in order to prevent those errors." 0 6 This
"presumption comports with the notion that the exclusionary rule ex-
ists to deter future police misconduct systemically."10 7 Common sense
suggests that application of the exclusionary rule provides a strong
incentive for policymakers and court administrators to monitor more
closely the integrity of court records.10 8
100. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1196 (StevensJ., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1200 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1200 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
D. Costs to Individual Liberty and Privacy
While the Court since Calandra has paid much attention to the
arguably minimal costs imposed on society's law enforcement inter-
ests, it has shown very little concern for the costs imposed on individ-
ual liberty and privacy that inevitably result from narrowing the
exclusionary rule. 10 9 This is perhaps the most glaring weakness in Ev-
ans because these costs may prove to be inordinately high. As Justice
Stevens noted,
The offense to the dignity of the citizen who is arrested,
handcuffed, and searched on a public street simply because
some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate com-
puter data base strikes me as ... outrageous. In this case, of
course, such an error led to the fortuitous detection of re-
spondent's unlawful possession of marijuana, and the sup-
pression of the fruit of the error would prevent the
prosecution of his crime. That cost, however, must be
weighed against the interest in protecting other, wholly inno-
cent citizens from unwarranted indignity."
Eventually, it may be these costs that undermine respect for, and pub-
lic confidence in, the judicial system and the law. An increase in the
number of innocent citizens subjected to unlawful searches and ar-
rests is likely to provoke public furor, particularly where no alternative
means exist to remedy the harm done. Even accepting the Court's
position that the exclusionary rule inevitably results in allowing a rela-
tively small number of guilty persons to go free, this cost must be con-
sidered in light of the need to preserve the right of citizens to be free
of invasive and humiliating unlawful searches and seizures.
In Evans, the Court attempted to diminish the impact of its ruling
on individual civil liberties by pointing to testimony in the record that
suggested that errors by court employees occur infrequently. 1 This
argument is self-defeating. If such errors were in fact rare, "that
would merely minimize the cost of enforcing the exclusionary
rule."1
12
A recent case involving the application of Evans demonstrates the
potential dangers of widespread computer error."' In People v. Down-
ing, the computer error that led to the unlawful search of the defend-
ant's home was committed by an inexperienced court clerk who, for
109. Id. at 1197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. People v. Downing, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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almost three full months, systematically input incorrect search waiver
expiration dates into a computer database.' 14 Moreover, in Evans, the
very court clerk who testified that errors were made only infrequently
later admitted that several other errors had been made that same
day. 115 When one considers the additional possibility of computer
malfunctions, the "conclusion that computer error poses no apprecia-
ble threat to Fourth Amendment interests" loses its force." 6
Justices O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, described what
she sees as the limited scope of Evans by pointing out that the exclu-
sionary rule might apply in a situation like Evans if the police, though
"innocent of the court employee's mistake," act unreasonably in their
"reliance on the recordkeeping system itself" 117 After Downing, it would
seem, California police reliance on this computer record, wrought
with widespread error, would not be reasonable."'
As Justice Souter noted in his concurrence, the Court in Evans
did not address questions regarding the scope of its holding and just
how far, in dealing with fruits of computerized error, our
very concept of deterrence by exclusion of evidence should
extend to the government as a whole, not merely the police,
on the ground that there would otherwise be no reasonable
expectation of keeping the number of resulting false arrests
within an acceptable minimum limit." 9
114. Id. at 179 (denying exclusion because facts did not show that police knew or should
have known about numerous errors in computer systems). In Downing, a California police
officer conducted an unlawful search of the defendant's home, relying on computer infor-
mation that erroneously indicated that the defendant was subject to a search waiver. Id. In
fact, the waiver had already expired at the time of the search. Id. An inexperienced court
clerk committed the error. Id. After only two and a half days of training, the clerk began
to systematically input erroneous waiver expiration dates from December 1989 until March
1990, when she was instructed on the proper procedure for calculating waiver expiration
dates. Id.
115. Initially, the chief clerk of the East Phoenix Number One Justice Court testified
that errors, such as the one that resulted in Evans's arrest, occurred once every three or
four years. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1196. In subsequent testimony, however, the clerk testified
that after the error in Evans's case was discovered, court employees initiated a search to
locate other possible errors in their records and, in fact, discovered that three other errors
were made the same day. Id.
116. Id. at 1197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1194 (O'Connor, Breyer, Souter,if., concurring) (maintaining that "it would
not be reasonable for the police to rely.., on a recordkeeping system, their own or some
other agency's, that has no mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that routinely
leads to false arrests").
118. See Downing, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187 n.26 ("We caution, however, that where the
police department has knowledge of flaws in a record or data base system, it would not
seem 'objectively reasonable' to rely solely on it without taking additional steps to insure its
accuracy.").
119. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Souter,J., concurring).
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By failing to define when the exclusionary rule should apply to gov-
ernment officials other than the police, and exactly when reliance on
computer systems becomes unreasonable, the Court left many unan-
swered questions for lower courts to address. Courts may have diffi-
culty in determining the point at which a police force knew or should
have known that it could not rely on the integrity of a computer sys-
tem. More important, the deterrence mechanism suggested by Justice
O'Connor 120 only kicks in after the damage has been done. According
to her formulation, the exclusionary rule would apply only after a
computer system is proven unreliable, which could delay corrective
action until after widespread abuses have taken place and public con-
fidence in law enforcement and the judicial system is undermined.
On the contrary, application of the exclusionary rule under circum-
stances similar to those in Evans provides prior incentive for law en-
forcement and court personnel to implement procedures to detect
such computer errors and to take corrective action if needed.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court, by broadening the good faith exception in Evans, con-
tinued its effort to narrow the scope of the exclusionary rule. The
Court wrongly concluded that the benefits of deterrence were out-
weighed by the cost to society's law enforcement interests. The Court
bolstered this conclusion by overemphasizing the costs to law enforce-
ment, a conclusion that is disputed by empirical evidence. 121 More
important, the Court failed to give adequate weight in its cost-benefit
analysis to the potential costs to individual liberty and privacy. Fortu-
nately, the concurrences of Justices O'Connor and Souter limit these
costs by recognizing the possibility of inappropriate reliance on an
inherently flawed computer or recordkeeping system. However,
whether such a limitation goes far enough to afford society the neces-
sary protection to individual liberty and privacy remains to be seen.
LAURA A. GIANTRIS
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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